Survivors may not recover for decedent’s loss of enjoyment of life

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The Otani Court reviewed the legislative history of the survival statutes. Although they were amended in 1993 to permit the estate to recover for the decedent’s pain and suffering, the decedent must have actually experienced those damages before dying. That could not be true of damages for loss of enjoyment of life where the decedent died before experiencing them.

The Court rejected the estate’s policy argument that unless such damages are available in survival actions, it is “cheaper for a tortfeasor to kill a plaintiff than to harm a plaintiff.” Other damages that are available under Washington’s wrongful-death statutes prevent this result. Those statutes also govern the scope of recovery when a tortfeasor negligently causes another’s death, but they permit specifically named beneficiaries to recover post-death damages that arise from the death. Those damages include the loss of financial support that the decedent would have provided to the beneficiaries. As a result, in many cases the defendant could be liable for more damages if the victim died than if the victim lived.

Three justices dissented. The dissent wrote, “The majority’s view fails to recognize that life itself has value and a person whose life is shortened by the wrongful conduct of another has suffered a grievous and compensable loss.”

The dissent noted that the courts of many states have permitted claimants to recover for shortened life expectancy as a separate item of damages. And, contrary to the majority’s rationale, “none of the cases ... require plaintiff’s conscious awareness of the loss as a prerequisite to recovery. ... [L]ife itself has value and a defendant should be required to pay damages for wrongful conduct that reduces a person’s life expectancy. To be sure, what is more valuable than life itself?”