County not liable for murder by released sex offender

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The trial court denied our summary judgment motion, concluding that the County somehow owed a specific duty to these plaintiffs, and ordered the County to proceed to trial. We sought discretionary review before Division Two of the Court of Appeals, which is a request that the appellate court take the unusual step of accepting review of the case even though the case has not yet concluded at the trial level.

The Court of Appeals accepted review, but after considering the merits, it affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals agreed with us that the notification statute imposed no duty to notify the public about a sex offender. However, the court held that the “rescue doctrine” created potential liability because the County undertook to notify the community about Rosenow and therefore assumed a duty to the Osborns, considering the County's contacts with other members of the community about Rosenow.

We petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court accepts review only rarely, but it granted our petition and agreed to review the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision by a 7-2 vote and ordered dismissal of the action against the County. The Court recognized that Mason County never promised to warn the Osborns of Rosenow. The Court agreed with us that, even though the sex-offender notification statute allowed for the possibility of notification, it created no duty to do so. The Supreme Court also held that, because the County had no authority to control Rosenow, it could not be liable for failing to supervise him. The Court agreed with us that the law imposed no duty on Mason County, and the common law did not recognize any duty either.