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Law precludes contributory fault of victim of statutory rape at school

The Court saw no reason to reach a different result in the civil context. The Court cited cases from South Carolina, Colorado, Oregon, and elsewhere in which courts held that the minor's consent is neither a partial nor a total defense to an adult's sexual-abuse tort.

Andersen and the District argued that Washington law has held children responsible for their contributory fault in tort cases. But those cases did not involve sexual torts. The Christensen Court emphasized, "The act of sexual abuse is key here. … Our public policy is directed to protecting children from such abuse."

The Court's second reason for its holding was Washington's longstanding rule that a school has a "special relationship" with students in its custody and a duty to protect them from foreseeable dangers. Children are placed in the care of school, and they lose the ability to protect themselves. "In sum, because we recognize the vulnerability of children in the school setting, we hold, as a matter of public policy, that children do not have a duty to protect themselves from sexual abuse by their teachers."

Two of the nine justices dissented. Justice Richard Sanders argued that the same rules of contributory fault that apply in other tort cases should apply equally here. He noted, "I fail to see why a minor can be contributorily negligent for driving a snowmobile but cannot be contributorily negligent in a negligence action relating to sexual misconduct. Generally contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury."

Justice Barbara Madsen concurred with the portion of the majority's decision that held that contributory fault is not available to Diaz as a damage-reducing defense. She argued, however, that a jury should decide “whether, through her conduct, the student failed to avoid injury caused by the alleged negligence of the school in hiring or supervising Diaz."

Both dissenting justices noted that the District alleged that Christensen had lied to her parents and school officials about what had occurred with Diaz.

   

   

 


Law precludes contributory fault of victim of statutory rape at school
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